What could judicial elections mean for Latin America?

What could judicial elections mean for Latin America?

On Monday 4 November, Canning House held a roundtable centring on the question: "Should Judges be elected?", touching on democracy, the judiciary and the separation of powers in Latin America. Dr. Carlos Elizondo, Professor Researcher at Tecnológico de Monterrey, and Dr. Laurence Whitehead, Senior Research Fellow at Nuffield College Oxford, offered their perspectives on judicial elections in Mexico and Bolivia.

Jeremy Browne, CEO of Canning House, opened the session by underscoring the significance of the topic, with the discussion held the day before a key Supreme Court decision in Mexico on the country’s judicial reform.

Dr. Elizondo’s analysis centred on Mexico, where reforms appear set to greatly alter the judiciary’s selection process. He began by outlining what he viewed as high stakes for the country. The reform, spearheaded initially by former President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO), proposes an unprecedented shift by enabling citizens to elect hundreds of judges, up to the highest levels of Mexico’s judiciary.

Questioning the practicality and transparency of such a system, Dr. Elizondo argued that it would be unrealistic for voters to make informed choices about such a large quantity of candidates. He warned that opening judicial seats to elections would likely strengthen political influence on the judiciary, rather than judicial independence.

Dr. Elizondo pointed out how Morena’s disciplined ruling coalition could reshape the judiciary to favour those with close political connections, arguing that this benefits the party’s ability to “centralise power.” He also expressed concern over the potential for high levels of misinformation and low prerequisites for judicial candidates, which, in his view, could result in a judiciary vulnerable to corruption and organised crime pressures. This situation, he argued, may deter foreign investment and threaten Mexico’s economic stability, particularly amidst the upcoming review of the USMCA trade agreement.

Offering a comparative case, Dr. Whitehead reflected on Bolivia's experience with elected judges since 2009. Bolivia’s judicial elections, introduced under President Evo Morales within a new Bolivian constitution, were intended to democratise a judiciary historically dominated by Bolivia’s White, wealthy elite, in a hangover from Spanish colonialism.

However, Dr. Whitehead argued, the reality was starkly different from the ideal. While the 2009 constitution aimed to increase judicial legitimacy through elections, the results have been marred by delays, poor public information, and accusations of government interference.

He further explained how the first judicial election in Bolivia, held a year later than planned, saw Morales’ party, the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS), exercising significant influence over judicial appointments through a congressional supermajority.

Whitehead recounted how Bolivia’s new judges quickly attracted criticism for partisan rulings, including decisions enabling Morales to pursue additional presidential terms, despite constitutional term limits. Public discontent grew, and the judicial system’s legitimacy was further eroded, as demonstrated by a staggering 65% abstention rate in subsequent elections.

This experience, Whitehead argued, illustrates the potential pitfalls of politicising judicial appointments, especially when the ruling party holds substantial control over candidate approval. He emphasised that Bolivia’s reforms failed to foster judicial independence and ultimately damaged public trust in the judiciary.

The speakers both agreed that judicial elections, if poorly designed, risk undermining judicial independence rather than enhancing it. Dr. Elizondo underscored that while Morena has the political power to push through such reforms, following its landslide election victory earlier this year, he argued that it is perhaps one driven more by AMLO’s personal legacy rather than popular demand.

Dr. Whitehead, reflecting on Bolivia’s experience, raised the question of sustainability, stressing that reforms like these are very difficult to undo once enacted. While some U.S. states have successfully implemented judicial elections to reflect local values, Bolivia’s case illustrates how vulnerable elected judiciaries can become without adequate checks and balances.

Questions from the audience touched upon topics ranging from organised crime and impunity rates, state capacity, and the separation of powers. Canning House thanks Dr. Elizondo and Dr. Whitehead for an illuminating discussion, and to all attendees for contributing to this timely and important dialogue.