The unintended consequences of Trump’s policies on hemispheric security

The unintended consequences of Trump’s policies on hemispheric security

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During his time as president-elect, Donald Trump made it abundantly clear that addressing uncontrolled migration to the US, perceived unfavourable trade relations, and the fentanyl emergency will be major priorities in his second term. Given the volume of preferential bilateral trade with Mexico (under the USMCA), China’s significant economic inroads in Latin America and the latter’s critical role in migration and drugs dynamics, the region is set to play a larger role in US strategic calculations than it has in recent decades. However, Trump’s proposed actions may backfire on their intended purposes by worsening conflict drivers in Latin America and ultimately undermining US and hemispheric security.

The trade-off of curbing migration and trade wars

Slashing uncontrolled migration into the US, including through increased deportations of undocumented workers, will not only place enormous pressure on Mexico but may inadvertently benefit (hyper) organised criminal groups in the region. The reintroduction of the "Remain in Mexico" programme or pressuring Mexico to declare itself a "safe third country" for migrants expelled from the US may lead to a concentration of vulnerable migrants in border cities. This, in turn, could create ideal recruiting grounds for criminal groups and a ready resource pool for their human trafficking activities.

At the same time, the growing demand for human smuggling services will likely reinforce the geo-economic might of these actors, by channelling additional revenues into their pockets. Portfolios and offerings of criminal groups in Mexico, Central, and South America, have been increasingly re-directed towards human smuggling and trafficking in recent years, given the booming business opportunity caused by restrictive immigration policies and rising humanitarian crises. Recent reports point to human smuggling rivalling drugs and extortion as their primary income streams at US$4-12bn per year.

Massive deportation of the estimated over 11m undocumented workers in the US will disproportionally impact Mexico and Central America- the region of origin of over 7m of those. Migrant reintegration will stretch these countries’ economic and institutional resources while lost remittances will create gaping holes in public finances. Remittances represent over 20% of GDP for most Central American countries and although the figure is just over 4% for Mexico, this source of revenue is particularly important for states such as Chiapas, Michoacán, Guerrero, Guanajuato and Jalisco, already suffering from armed violence and poverty.

The pressure on Mexico to ensure migrant deterrence at its Southern borders and cater for expelled migrants will pose another formidable financial challenge for the country. This, combined with threatened hikes in tariffs, will likely result in a further deterioration in socio-economic conditions and reduced opportunities in the legal economy. Crucially, it will also undermine state reach and legitimacy—ultimately benefitting the quasi-state ambitions of criminal actors.

The onset of another trade and economic war with China could also undermine economic and security dynamics in Latin America. The immense cost of decoupling from a major economic partner—if pressured by the US to do so—could destabilise the region, while an antagonised China may respond by increasing support to authoritarian regimes and enabling malicious activities by revisionist powers there.

The perils of an ‘America first’ anti-narcotics policy

Trump’s ‘America first’ and insular worldview will likely translate, in anti-narcotics terms, into a primary focus of resources and efforts on fentanyl, the leading cause of overdose deaths in the US, and into combatting the organised groups producing and trafficking it, namely Mexican drug-trafficking organisations (and indirectly those supplying precursors, primarily from China).

Trump’s threats of listing Mexican cartels as terrorist organisations and US military interventions against these are not only troubling from an international law and Mexican sovereignty point of view, but also for the heavily punitive and supply focused approach to the problem they signal. Experience shows that such an approach is not fit for purpose: fentanyl’s potency allows smaller quantities to be trafficked, making it easier to get past authorities and harder to seize in laboratories. Furthermore, the fragmented nature of the fentanyl business and the sheer number of players make a military response both time and cost ineffective.

For fentanyl particularly, addressing demand is an essential part of the solution, including prevention, safe use, treatment and recovery initiatives. Experience also shows king-pin strategies are doomed to fail if not accompanied by measures to address corruption, impunity, institutional weaknesses and lack of economic opportunities - which do not seem part of the package considering Trump’s transactional approach to democratic principles and rule of law in his previous stint as president. China’s much needed cooperation in addressing the fentanyl crisis is also unlikely to be forthcoming amid an increasingly hostile US policy toward it.

More broadly, this ‘insular’ anti-narcotics policy will likely mean criminal dynamics in South America and cocaine will be a lesser priority for the US, at a time when organised criminal groups are increasingly transnational and diversified in their business operations. The unprecedented sophistication and international presence of criminal syndicates originating from Latin America call for more international cooperation and coordination and for security policies which are global in design and implementation. A retrenched US abdicating its regional leadership in security matters will strengthen criminal economies and actors, escalate organised violence in Latin America and lead to greater insecurity in the US and across the Western Hemisphere.